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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
Responsibility-sharing for 
refugees (1)
Law’s production of superfluity as an analytical lens
When the German Minister of the Interior a few weeks ago 
announced that “the refugee crisis has not been resolved, but 
its solution is on a very good way”, he was obviously not 
speaking about the global situation. He was referring to the 
situation in Europe and particularly in Germany, where after 
the successive closure of the Balkan route and the agreement 
between the EU and Turkey in March (as discussed here), the 
number of persons arriving has dropped significantly. On the 
global level, UNHCR counts more than 65 million displaced 
persons. And while European policies place a strong 
emphasis on the “securization of external borders” and 
“reducing incentives of irregular migration” (cf. here), the 

European share in receiving refugees is minor in comparison: 
94 percent of the world’s forcibly displaced find shelter 
outside Europe, by far most of them in the Global South. The 
situation of refugees worldwide involves numerous sites that 
receive little attention, and numerous protracted refugee 
situations, in which persons remain in a state of 
displacement for years if not for generations.
Under those conditions, solutions for refugees that exclude 
from view the question of responsibility-sharing must appear 
shortsighted. I will not address here the issue of inner-
European responsibility-sharing, which exhibits many 
parallel features, but only speak about responsibility-sharing 
on the global level. Four aspects thereby interrelate: the 
highly unequal distribution of responsibility for refugees, 
increasing tendencies of border securization and 
externalization of migration control, the shortcomings in 
guaranteeing refugee rights in many places, and the role of 
humanitarian agencies in protection. My interest in this two-
part blog article will be to sketch some ideas how the notion 
of “law’s production of superfluity”, as Susan Marks has 
introduced it, might provide a helpful lens for understanding 
those interdependencies and how it might inform our 
reflections about global responses to the cause of refugees.
Responsibility-sharing and the question of access to 
territory
Mobility, or more specifically the access to territory, 
constitutes a crucial aspect in the plight of refugees. As 
Hannah Arendt seminally formulated, it is not so much the 
“loss of a home but the impossibility of finding a new one” 
(OT, 293), which stands at the basis of their particular 
condition of rightlessness. Arendt’s analysis at the same 
time describes the dilemma of law as a means for improving 
the situation of refugees: Since rights by nature depend on 
the relationship between persons, rights imagined as 
universal are likely to be ineffective exactly the moment they 
would be needed the most. This dilemma of rights at the 
borders of political communities becomes manifest when 
states on the one hand uphold differentiated regimes of 
refugee rights, while at the same time employing measures to 
hinder persons from entering the territory where they can 
claim these rights. The Southern borders of the European 
Union constitute one site in which this is visible today; 
similar situations occur at the shores of Australia, or the 
Southern border of the United States.
But the question of access to territory not only plays a role in 
the relationship between individuals seeking protection and 
the respective states; it equally works to distribute 
responsibility for refugees between states. Among the 
instruments by which powerful states continue to shift 
responsibility for refugees to less powerful states are 
measures of border surveillance and physical barriers, as well 
as legal instruments such as the notion of safe third countries 
and corresponding readmission agreements. The successive 
development of non-entrée regimes by states of the Global 
North has long been criticized, and it has been pointed out 
how it contributes to an downward spiral in the quality of 
refugee protection world-wide, diminishing the willingness 
of refugee receiving states in the Global South to guarantee 
refugee rights and allow local integration.
Law’s production of superfluity 
The living conditions of refugees in the Global South thus 
cannot be regarded in detachment from questions of 
responsibility-sharing and border regulation. This works in 
both directions: poor conditions and opportunities for 
refugees in neighboring regions of their states of origin will 
cause many to travel onwards, prompting new debates about 
migration control. In that vein, it was only the arrival of 
Syrian refugees in Europe and the realization that persons 
were willing to take this journey despite the many obstacles 
and perils, which prompted an increase in support of refugee 
assistance in Jordan and the Lebanon, “to stem the exodus”.
More important even seems how the regulation of access in 
one part of the world impacts on conditions of protection in 
other parts, far beyond the immediate presence of persons: 
This became apparent when a few days after the EU-Turkey 
agreement, Kenya – already for decades one of the largest 
refugee receiving state – declared that it would close the 
Dadaab refugee camps, which have hosted at times more 
than 400.000 Somalian refugees. In light of the fact that the 
European Union was well willing to pay for not receiving a 
substantive number of refugees, and for not being directly 
confronted with a gross dilemma regarding its fundamental 
values, assuming the task to provide for refugees without 
such return service suddenly seemed much less evident. (For 
the current debate about the closure of Dadaab cf. e.g. here
and here.) In that sense, we can view policies of border 
securization and deterrence to work as communications 
beyond direct legal agreements. We find several examples
recently for this logic of trading (the non-arrival of) refugees. 
It found most clear expression when the President of Turkey, 
discontented about the implementation of the agreement, 
threatened to “flood Europe with migrants”. The idea that 
one could threaten a continent with migrants did not seem 
to surprise as such, rather it captured the reasoning of the 
agreement.
Trying to understand how this logic assumes a wider 
significance, Susan Marks’ notion of “(the production of) 
superfluity” might offer an analytical tool: Marks suggests 
that legal rules can contribute to frame social interrelations 
in such a way as to “produce superfluity”, meaning the 
perception of persons as unneeded and dispensable, their 
mere existence being a problem, or outright threat. This 
perception as superfluous must thereby in no way 
correspond to persons actually not being needed (as  in the 
case of Europe, demographers and economists have 
kept asserting that there is demand for immigration). Legal 
arrangements that construe refugees as costs to be traded, 
and the effect that has for the willingness to receive refugees 
elsewhere, constitute one example for how measures aimed 
at “solutions” also contribute to the problem. More generally, 
we can analyze through that lens of a legal production of 
superfluity the conditions of access to territory: Border 
regulations and restrictions on mobility will regularly work to 
concentrate on few routes persons, which in turn are 
perceived as “uncontrollable masses”, and as such become a 
factor in renewed debates about the need for border 
regulation.
Humanitarian reason in refugee protection
The legal production of superfluity also corresponds with the 
perplexities of a “humanitarian reason” in refugee protection. 
This is not identical with but links to the increasing role that 
humanitarian agencies play in international protection: Since 
the 1950s, UNHCR together with governmental and non-
governmental partner organizations became engaged in 
material assistance to refugees, in particular in states of the 
Global South. This engagement in material assistance 
continuously grew over the years, fueled by (and contributing 
to) the question of responsibility-sharing: As states 
neighboring regions of conflict felt left alone with the task to 
provide for protection, humanitarian actors assumed an ever 
growing part in assisting refugees, amounting to a situation 
in which UNHCR is described as a “surrogate state” for 
refugees.
The arising constellation can be seen as triangular 
relationship between host states, which continue to accept 
refugees to their territory, humanitarian agencies, which – 
often in refugee camps – provide for shelter and basic needs, 
and donor states, which contribute monetarily. It has a self-
reinforcing tendency: As donor states are interested that 
refugees remain in their regions of origin, the work of 
humanitarian agencies will uphold the highly unequal 
numbers of refugees hosted in different parts of the world. 
The need for funding thereby incentivizes a separation of 
refugees from the general population and a restriction of 
their mobility, as persons have to be clearly visible and 
locatable. And the lacking possibility of local integration and 
limitations on social and economic rights in turn contribute 
to a continuous dependence of refugees on aid, fostering the 
perception as burden. A humanitarian reason in protection 
thus tends to – while ensuring immediate relief – also 
perpetuate the status of  persons as refugees and dependent.
This is the first part of two posts on the question of global 
responsibility-sharing. A second post addresses the debate on 
“global solutions” for refugees.
Dana Schmalz is a co-editor of the blog and currently an 
LL.M-student at the Cardozo School of Law.
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